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STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judg-
ment awarding plaintiffs a real estate commission on the sale 
of a commercial property which was the subject of a written ex-
clusive listing agreement. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
In this action, plaintiffs seek an award of a real 
estate sales commission pursuant to a written exclusive listing 
agreement for the sale of a commercial building owned by the 
defendants. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On August 30, 1985, cross-motions for summary judgment 
were argued before the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, pre-
siding. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
On October 8, 1985, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants 
entitling plaintiffs to a real estate commission pursuant to 
the exclusive listing agreement. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. is a Utah corpora-
tion and Victor R. Ayers, a licensed real estate broker, is the 
designated broker for Gump & Ayers (collectively "Gump & Ayers"). 
R. 3 para. 1-2. 
2. Defendant Domcoy Investors V is a California limited 
partnership ("Domcoy"). R. 153, p. 25. 
3. Defendant Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corpo-
ration (the "Domcoy Corporation") is the sole general partner 
of Domcoy. R. 153, p. 12. 
4. The Domcoy Corporation is owned by the following 
individuals in the following percentages: Mr. and Mrs. Eugene 
E. Doms (50%) and Mr. and Mrs. Michael R. McCoy (50%). Mr. McCoy 
("McCoy") and Mr. Doms ("Doms") are officers and directors of 
Domcoy Corporation with McCoy serving as President. McCoy is a 
practicing attorney, and was admitted to the California Bar in 
1975. R. 153, p. 12. 
5. Domcoy was formed in late 1982 for the purpose of 
acquiring real property in Salt Lake City, Utah, specifically 
the Sterling-Greenwald Building, located at 35 West Broadway 
("Property"). The Property is classified as a historic structure. 
Such a classification bestows unique tax advantages to investors/ 
owners. R. 153, p. 25. 
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6. Domcoy purchased the Property in December, 1982. 
R. 153, p. 29. 
7. Doms, representing Domcoy, interviewed numerous 
brokers in an attempt to list the Property. In the spring of 
1984, at Gump & Ayers main office in Salt Lake City, Doms inter-
viewed Ronald W. Christensen ("Christensen"), the manager of 
the Commercial Division of Gump & Ayers. R. 152, p. 11. 
8. During the initial meeting between Christensen 
and Doms, Doms requested, and later received, from Gump & Ayers 
a marketing proposal for the Property. R. 152, p. 15. 
9. Copies of the marketing proposal were sent to Doms 
and McCoy, after which Doms told Christensen that McCoy would 
contact Gump & Ayers concerning the marketing of the Property. 
R. 152, p. 15. 
10. In July of 1984, Christensen and McCoy met. McCoy 
told Christensen that Domcoy's plans for marketing the Property, 
that is, whether to lease or sell office condominiums, and the 
price for such, were yet to be determined. McCoy also told Chris-
tensen that Domcoy's plans were still in flux because it was 
studying the procedure for historic rehabilitation certification 
and the tax credits available. This was information that poten-
tial tenants would find material. 
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11. During a subsequent meeting between McCoy and 
Christensen, a discussion was had concerning the general marketing 
of the Property, the present inability to establish an exact 
price for sale or lease of the Property and the fact that McCoy 
would personally handle the marketing of the Property while Doms 
would be responsible for the construction/rehabilitation of the 
Property. R. 152, p. 32. 
12. During the aforementioned meeting, or at a subse-
quent meeting, between Christensen and McCoy, a Sales Agency 
Contract between Gump & Ayers and Domcoy was discussed ("Listing 
Agreement"). Appendix I. In discussing the Listing Agreement, 
Christensen told McCoy that the document was broad enough to 
entitle Gump & Ayers to a commission whether the Property was 
leased, sold or exchanged and, in addition, that once the Listing 
Agreement was signed, Gump & Ayers could market and put a sign 
on the Property. Christensen also told McCoy that Domcoy would 
have the ultimate decision on whether the Property was sold or 
leased as well as the ultimate purchase price for the Property. 
Christensen would not have marketed or placed a sign on the prop-
erty without such a signed Listing Agreement. R. 152, pp. 32-35. 
13. After Christensen explained the Listing Agreement 
to McCoy, McCoy read it and signed it. R. 153, p. 33, 44; P. 
152, p. 36. 
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14. McCoy signed the Listing Agreement in his capacity 
as President of the Domcoy Corporation and as General Partner 
of Domcoy. R. 153, p. 33. 
15. In addition to being a lawyer, McCoy had substantial 
experience in the real estate development having bought and sold 
approximately 17 properties over the 5 year period preceding 
the Listing Agreement. R. 153, pp. 6-24. 
16. Prior to the execution of the exclusive listing 
agreement with Gump & Ayers, Domcoy had signed several single 
party or non-exclusive listing agreements with other brokers. 
These non-exclusive agreements had not resulted in a sale or 
lease of the building. 
17. During the meeting at which McCoy signed the Listing 
Agreement, Christensen explained to him that an "Available" sign 
posted on the Property would denote that the Property was avail-
able for sale, lease or exchange. McCoy had no objection to 
having this particular type of sign placed on the Property. 
R. 152, p. 40. 
18. On August 29, 1984, after the Listing Agreement 
was signed by McCoy, Gump & Ayers put an "Available" sign on 
the Property and actively began its efforts to market the Prop-
erty. R. 152, p. 24. 
19. After the Listing Agreement was signed by McCoy 
and Gump & Ayers's sign was placed on the Property, McCoy and 
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Christensen spoke often by telephone concerning the progress of 
the construction on the property and any inquiries received by 
Gump & Ayers from potential buyers or tenants. McCoy was respon-
sive to the marketing needs of Gump & Ayers and the information 
needs of prospective tenants. R. 152, p. 48. 
20. During the month of December 1984, the communication 
channels between Christensen and McCoy broke down. Christensen 
had arranged two meetings with McCoy at Gump & Ayers main Salt 
Lake City Office. These meetings were intended to show the Prop-
erty to prospective purchasers and/or tenants. McCoy agreed to 
such meetings on two separate occasions but failed to attend 
the meetings without any advance notice to Christensen. R. 152, 
pp. 49-52. 
21. After McCoy failed to meet with Christensen, Chris-
tensen called Domcoy's counsel to find out why the appointments 
were missed. Christensen was informed by Domcoy's counsel that 
he did not know. In addition, after McCoy missed the appointments 
he also failed to return any of Christensen's telephone calls. 
Approximately two weeks after the appointments were missed, 
Domcoy's counsel told Christensen that the Property had been 
sold and, in addition, he apologized for the "break-down in com-
munication". R. 152, p. 53. 
22. The Property was sold by Domcoy to an entity known 
as Garfield Residential Ltd. Partneship #611, a Connecticut 
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limited partnership ("Garfield") on December 31, 1984. R. 153 
p. 34 
23. At no time, either before or after the Property's 
sale to Garfield, did a representative of Domcoy inform Gump & 
Ayers that the Listing Agreement had been terminated. R. 153 
pp. 56, 57. 
24. The Property was initially sold for $5,857,000.00. 
R. 153. p. 36. However, the Sales Agreement was later amended 
and the sales price was reduced to $4,900,000.00. R 130, Para. 1. 
25. According to the express terms of the Listing Agree-
ment, a six-percent (6%) commission was payable to Gump & Ayers 
if, during the term of the Listing Agreement, the Property was 
sold, leased or exchanged by the owner, or any other party. R. 
48, Para. 2. 
26. The Listing Agreement also provided that such a 
commission would be due and payable upon the closing of the sale 
or exchange, unless otherwise agreed in writing. The parties 
did not agree in writing to have the commission paid at any other 
time. R. 48 Para. 2. 
27. Gump & Ayers made repeated demands upon Domcoy 
for a commission of 6-percent (6%) of the price paid by Garfield 
for the Property; however, Domcoy refused to pay the commission. 
R. 39 Para. 30. 
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28. On or about February 8, 1985, this action was filed 
by Gump & Ayers seeking its commission from Domcoy. R. 2 
29. After discovery, cross-motions for Summary Judgment 
were filed by Gump & Ayers and Domcoy. These motions were argued 
on August 30, 1985, before the Third Judicial District Court, 
the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding. R. 101. 
30. On October 8, 1985, the Trial Court granted Summary 
Judgment in favor of Gump & Ayers. R. 108. 
31. This appeal followed. R. 123. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Gump & Ayers and Domcoy voluntarily and at arm's length 
entered into an exclusive listing agreement for the sale of the 
historic Sterling-Greenwald Building. In reliance on the Listing 
Agreement, Gump & Ayers spent time and money in its efforts to 
market the Property. After the Property was sold, Domcoy sought 
to avoid payment of the commisson. It did not seek to cancel or 
reform the agreement based upon fraud, misrepresentation or mutual 
mistake of fact—for these claims were not and in good faith could 
not be raised. Rather, it sought to avoid its contractual obli-
gations because the Listing Agreement was not "sufficiently defi-
nite" to be enforced. Despite the fact that cross-motions for 
summary judgment were filed, Domcoy now argues that extrinsic 
facts are necessary to interpret the Listing Agreement. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
GUMP & AYERS ON THE LISTING AGREEMENT. 
A. Introduction 
In essence, Domcoy argues that the District Court erred 
in granting Summary Judgment in favor of Gump & Ayers on the List-
ing Agreement because there are disputed issues of material fact 
concerning the intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement. 
Specifically, the Domcoy contends: 
(1) That its intent in signing the Listing Agreement 
was merely as an "accommodation" to allow Gump & Ayers to 
place an "Available" sign on the Property; 
(2) That there was no meeting of the minds concerning 
a commission; and 
(3) That the Listing Agreement is too vague to be en-
forceable since no listed price or term was included. 
Based upon these alleged infirmities, Domcoy contends 
that the intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement could not 
be ascertained from the Listing Agreement standing alone and, 
therefore, extrinsic evidence should have been received by the 
District Court to arrive at the parties1 intent. As will be shown 
below, this contention is erroneous. 
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The Listing Agreement is exclusive. It is well-estab-
lished that a broker earns a real estate commission pursuant to 
an exclusive listing agreement when the subject property is sold 
during the term of such agreement. This Court has enforced ex-
clusive listing agreements because of their necessity in the real 
estate industry. Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P.2d 84 
(1963). In the Chumney decision, it was stated: 
Moreover, the type of "exclusive right to 
sell" real estate listings involved in this 
action has been universally upheld. The nature 
of the real estate business, wherein the broker 
is paid only if a sale is made, would seem 
to make the contract provision here in question 
a reasonable one. 
14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86. The property in Chumney was sold 
to a buyer who had not dealt in any way with the broker; rather, 
the sale was made by the owner without the broker's knowledge. 
Yet, it was held that the broker was entitled to a commission. 
The reasoning of Chumney is applicable to the facts of 
this case. The parties entered into an exclusive Listing Agree-
ment. Based upon the Agreement, Gump & Ayers invested its time 
and money in the marketing of the Property. It would not have 
marketed the Property without knowing it would be compensated 
for its efforts when the property was sold. Domcoy accepted the 
full benefit of Gump & Ayers's services and encouraged Gump & 
Ayers in its marketing efforts. The Property was sold before 
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the Listing Agreement was terminated; therefore, a commission 
was earned by Gump & Ayers. 
B. The Listing Agreement is not Ambiguous 
As this Court stated in its decision in the case of 
Oberhansly v. Earle, 
It is a basic principle of contract law that 
there can be no contract without a meeting 
of the minds of the parties which must be 
spelled out either expressly or impliedly 
with sufficient definiteness to allow enforce-
ment . . . Of course the intentions of the 
parties are controlling and normally those 
intentions can be found from the instrument 
itself. If a writing is not sufficient to 
establish meaning, however, resort may be 
had to extraneous evidence manifesting the 
intentions of the parties. 
572 P.2d 1384 at 1386 (Utah 1975). See also Bennett v. Robin-
son's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d, 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966). 
As discussed in the Oberhansly decision, a court's first 
and foremost task in determining the intent of the parties to a 
written agreement is to determine whether the agreement is ambig-
uous. This determination is a question of law to be decided by 
the court, Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983); Hippon v. Truck Insurance 
Exchange, 657 P.2d 1358 (Utah 1983); Winegar v. Smith Investment 
Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah 1979), and any ambiguity must be apparent 
on the face of the written agreement; merely because the parties 
disagree as to its meaning does not render an agreement ambig-
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uous. In re the Marriage of Anderson, 711 P.2d 699 (Colo. App. 
1985). 
A contract is ambiguous when the meaning or application 
of words in the contract are doubtful or uncertain. Winecrar v. 
Smith Investment Co., supra. A review of the Listing Agreement 
reveals no such ambiguity.1 
The Listing Agreement was read and signed by McCoy, an 
attorney and experienced developer, in his capacities as President 
of the Domcoy Corporation and as a General Partner of the Domcoy 
Partnership. R. 153, p. 44. McCoy had the burden not only to 
read, but also to understand, the Listing Agreement before he 
1
 The Listing Agreement provides, in relevant part: 
In consideration of [Gump & Ayers] agreement to 
list the property . . . and to use reasonable efforts 
to find a purchaser or tenant therefore, [Domcoy Inves-
tors V and Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.] hereby grant[s] 
you for the period stated herein, from date hereof, 
the exclusive right to sell,- lease, or exchange said 
property or any part thereof, at the price and terms 
stated herein, or at such other price or terms to which 
I may agree in writing. 
During the life of this contract, if you find a 
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease or 
exchange said property or any part thereof, at said 
price and terms, or any other price or terms, to which 
I may agree in writing, or if said property or any part 
thereof is sold, leased or exchanged during said term 
by myself or any other party, I agree to pay [Gump & 
Ayers] a commission of 6% of such sale, lease or exchange 
price which commission unless otherwise agreed in writing 
shall be due and payable on the date of closing of the 
sale, lease or exchange. 
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signed it. Resource Management Company v. Western Ranch and Live-
stock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). 
In the Listing Agreement, Domcoy agreed that a commission 
would be paid to Gump & Ayers if, and when, any one of the 
following conditions precedent ocurred during its term ("Condi-
tions") : 
(1) Gump & Ayers produced a party who was ready, wil-
ling and able to buy the property at the listed price; 
(2) Gump & Ayers produced a party who agreed to buy 
the Property at a price agreed to in writing by defendants; 
or 
(3) the Property was sold by Domcoy or any other party, 
at any price. 
The Property was sold to a party who, concededly, was 
not produced by Gump & Ayers; nevertheless, Gump & Ayers is en-
titled to a commission since the Listing Agreement expressly pro-
vides for a commission in such event. Despite that provision, 
Domcoy argues that because a Listed Price and the term were omitted 
from the Listing Agreement, it is ambiguous and summary judgment 
was inappropriate. As will be demonstrated below, these omissions 
were not essential to enforcement of the Listing Agreement, nor 
do they render the Listing Agreement ambiguous. 
1. The Omitted Listed Price does not Render the Listing 
Agreement Ambiguous. Domcoy contends that the omission of a Listed 
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Price from the Listing Agreement .renders it ambiguous and, there-
fore, summary judgment was inappropriate. This contention is 
incorrect. The omission from the Listing Agreement of a Listed 
Price merely negated one of the Conditions precedent set forth 
in the Listing Agreement upon which a commission would be earned. 
In fact, the omission of a Listed Price inured to the benefit of 
Domcoy. By omitting a Listed Price, Gump & Ayers was deprived 
of the Listing Agreement's protection in the event they produced 
a "ready, willing and able" buyer but, for some reason, Domcoy 
refused to sell. Since there is no Listed Price against which a 
court could gauge the readiness, ability or willingness of a pro-
posed buyer, the Property would have to be sold before a commission 
was earned. 
A Listed Price is wholly inapplicable to sales embraced 
by the second or third Conditions set forth above. It follows 
that although the Property was sold to a party who was not produced 
by Gump & Ayers, a commission was earned since the Listing Agree-
ment unambiguously provides for a commission in such an event. 
2. The Omission of the Term does not Render the Listing 
Agreement Ambiguous. With respect to the Listing Agreement's 
omission of its term, courts have overwhelmingly held that agency 
relationships, which by definition are consensual, are terminable 
at will by either the principal or the agent, which power of termi-
nation is not affected by either an express or impled contract 
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between the parties that the agency is irrevocable. See e.g. 
McDonald Company v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 572 
P.2d 195 (Mont. 1977), Peterson v. Peterson, 700 P.2d 585 (Kan. 
App. 1985); Ireland v. Wvnkop, 539 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1975). 
Granted, either the principal or the agent may sue the other for 
breach of the agency agreement based upon termination contrary 
to the agreement, but the agency relationship itself is terminable 
at will. 
The foregoing principle was specifically applied to a 
real estate listing agreement without a definite period of dura-
tion in Jaudon v. Slink, 276 S.E. 2d 507 (N.C. App. 1981). In 
that case, the court held the listing agreement to be revocable 
at will by either party. Similarly, this Court applied the prin-
ciple to an employment contract in its decision in the case of 
Bullocks v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 
P.2d 559 (1960). In Bullocks, it was held that: 
Absent other controlling facts, it is gen-
erally recognized that under such a provision 
[a general statement in the employment con-
tract that defendant agreed to employ plain-
tiff without any mention of term of employ-
ment] either party may terminate the employ-
ment at will. 
11 Utah 2d at 4; 354 P.2d at 562. Thus, in this case, the parties1 
omission of the term of the Listing Agreement is not fatal to its 
enforcement, rather, such omission merely allowed Domcoy to termi-
nate the Listing Agreement at any time. 
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Domcoy admits that it did not terminate or revoke the 
Listing Agreement before the sale of the Property. In his depo-
sition, McCoy stated: 
Q. At any time since July 1, of 1984, have you ever 
informed Ron Christensen that Gump & Ayers was not to proceed 
with the marketing of the Sterling Greenwald Building? 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge has anyone representing Domcoy 
told Ron Christensen of Gump & Ayers that he was not to pro-
ceed with the marketing of the Sterling Greenwald building? 
A. No. 
Q. Has anyone told Ron Christensen of Gump & Ayers 
that he was not to proceed with the marketing of the Sterling 
Greenwald Building? 
A. No. 
R. 153, p.55, 56. 
Under such facts, and according to agency law, the Dis-
trict Court properly granted summary judgment entitling Gump & 
Ayers to its commission. The Listing Agreement is not ambiguous 
and expressly states that Gump & Ayers was entitled to a commis-
sion notwithstanding the fact that the property was sold to a 
party procured by the seller or some person rather than Gump & 
Ayers. 
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C Any Ambiguities in the Listing Agreement were Properly Resolved 
by the District Court as a Matter of Law, 
Even if this Court finds that the Listing Agreement 
was ambiguous because of the omission of its term or a Listed 
Price, the resolution of such ambiguities was a question of law 
for the District Court to resolve. Overson v, United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Co., 587 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978); Petty v. Gindy 
Manufacturing Corp., 17 Utah 2d 332 404 P.2d 30 (1965). Before 
the District Court, Domcoy did not traverse the facts that McCoy 
signed the Listing Agreement in July of 1984, and that the Listing 
Agreement was never revoked. Such being the case, the District 
Court properly resolved any ambiguity as to when the Listing Agree-
ment became effective by concluding, as a matter of law, that it 
became effective in July of 1984. In addition, any ambiguity as 
to the duration of the Listing Agreement was properly resolved 
by reference to the general agency principle that an agency rela-
tionship is revocable at will by either the principal or the agent, 
as discussed above, and that no such revocation occurred in this 
case. 
Finally, perhaps the most important fact concerning 
the intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement is McCoy's 
candid admission in his deposition that if Gump & Ayers produced 
a buyer who bought either the entire building, or a portion there-
of, after the Listing Agreement was signed, the six-percent (6%) 
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commission set forth in the Listing Agreement would have been 
paid. R. 153; pp. 39-40. This acknowledgement underscores the 
unambiguous intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement, and 
illuminates Domcoy's desire to treat the Listing Agreement as a 
legal buffet from which they can discriminately select the favor-
able provisions, such as Gump & Ayers marketing of the Property, 
while ignoring the distasteful provisions, such as their duty to 
pay a commission. The Utah decisions on the subject hold other-
wise. Sellers may not take advantage of the services of a broker 
and, subsequently, disregard their liability to pay a commission 
based upon a non-essential infirmity in the Listing Agreement. 
In Morris v. John Price Associates, Inc., 590 P.2d 315 
(Utah 1979), the broker sought a commission arising from the lease 
of office space. The writing supporting the claimed commission 
was a letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff that merely 
stated the following: "This letter is to assure you that we will 
cover you on a six percent commission is a successful lease is 
negotiated with IBM on the second building on Meridian Park Office 
Building". This Court held that the letter was sufficient to 
entitle the broker to his commission despite the fact that the 
lease price, the duration of the agency and even the signature 
of the broker were omitted from the agreement. 
Another Utah decision concerning the payment of a real 
estate commission is Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen Brothers 
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Construction Company, 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982). In that case, 
the listing agreement was signed only by the owner and provided 
that the agent would be entitled to a six-percent commission on 
the sale of a house. This Court acknowledged that the agreement 
was undated and that the duration that the agreement was to remain 
in effect was omitted. Nevertheless, it was held that the listing 
agreement was enforceable and the payment of a commission was 
ordered. It was noted in the Taylor National decision that the 
actions of the parties showed that they intended to be bound by 
the Listing Agreement. 
Similarly, in the present case, the actions of the par-
ties indicated that they intended to be bound by the terms of 
the Listing Agreement. Gump & Ayers posted a sign on the Property 
and actively pursued steps in the marketing of the Property. 
Gump & Ayers referred interested parties to Domcoy and McCoy ad-
mitted in his deposition that if a buyer or tenant had been found 
by Gump & Ayers, a six-percent commission would have been paid 
to Gump & Ayers. 
To summarize, the Listing Agreement was not ambiguous 
and did not lack any essential terms. McCoy, an attorney, read 
and presumably understood the Listing Agreement before he signed 
it. Although the Property was sold to a buyer produced by someone 
other than Gump & Ayers, a commission was due and payable to Gump 
& Ayers pursuant to the express provisions of the Listing Agree-
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ment. Domcoy's attempts to argue otherwise should be viewed in 
light of this Court's advisory statement in the case of Kier v, 
Condrac, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, 330 (1970): 
We recognize the validity of the rules relied 
upon by the defendants said to be enforceable 
a contract must be sufficiently definite in 
its terms that the party know what is required 
of them. But like all rules, which are neces-
sarily stated in generality, it is only appli-
cable in the proper circumstances, where the 
justice of the case requires as a shield to 
protect the party from injustice and not as 
a weapon with which to perpetrate injustice. 
Gump & Ayers submits that an injustice would be perpetrated should 
Domcoy be allowed to escape the consequences of the Listing 
Agreement in which they agreed to pay a real estate commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth above, and the cases 
cited therein, this Court should affirm the District Court's Order 
granting summary judgment to Gump & Ayers on the grounds and for 
the reasons that the Listing Agreement is not ambiguous and Gump 
& Ayers is, therefore, entitled to a real estate commission as a 
matter of law. 
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